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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. 1\icMULLIN, 
Appellant and Plaintiff 
vs. 
LYNWOOD F. SHil\fMIN and JACQUIE 
A. SHIMMIN, 
Respondents and Defendants 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8998 
The parties to this appeal are agreed upon the facts 
except as to the final ruling of the lower court. If re-
spondents' position on that ruling is correct, there would 
be no need for this appeal because plaintiff's claim for 
damages would not be precluded and a new action could 
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2 
be commenced to recover them. It appears most likely, 
however, that respondents would and could successfully 
impose the defense of res judicata in any such new action 
on the present state of the record. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT SEEKING TO ENFORCE SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE OF THIS CONTRACT BUT RATHER ASK-
ING FOR THE ALTERNATIVE RELIEF FOR DAMAGES 
PRAYED FOR A'T THE TIME THIS ACTION WAS COM-
MENCED. 
-POINT H. 
A SELLER SHOULD NOT BE BARRED FROM RECOVER-
ING DAMAGES AS AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY TO 
SPE•CIFI'C PERFORMANCE BY REASON OF SELLING THE 
SUBJECT PROPERTY AFTER BRINGING AN ACTION TO 
ENFORCE THE CONTRACT OF SALE. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF HAVING RETAINED THE EARNEST 
MONEY SHOULD NOT BE BARRED FROM RECOVERY IN 
AN ACTION AT LAW FOR DAMAGES EVEN IF THE DE-
CISION OF ANDREASON v. HANSEN IS SOUND ON ITS 
PARTICULAR FACTS. 
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PLAINTIFF IS NOT SEEKING TO ENFORCE SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE OF THIS CONTRACT BUT RATHER ASK-
ING FOR THE ALTERNATIVE RELIEF FOR DAMAGES 
PRAYED FOR A'T THE TIME THIS A'CTION WAS COM-
MENCED. 
Appellant could not and does not contend that he is 
entitled to a decree for specific perfonnance inas1nuch 
as he was able to sell the property in question prior to 
the trial of this cause in the pursuance of his business 
and in mitigation of his damages and defendants' lia-
bility. Thus, the authorities cited by respondent under 
this point are irrelevant in appellant's opinion. This com-
ment with respect to the Utah case of Foxley v. Rich, 
5 U 162, 99 P 666 (1909), cited by respondents, however, 
ought to be made to avoid any misunderstanding that 
the factual situation there was in any way comparable 
to the case in question. In that case a buyer brought an 
action to recover money paid on an executory contract 
by reason of an alleged conveyance that made it imposs-
ible for the seller to perform the contract. He contended 
that such conduct on the part of seller constituted an 
abandonment and repudiation of the agreement. The 
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question there was whether or not an absolute conveyance 
had been made to a third party by the seller before any 
breach by the buyer and before any action had been taken 
to enforce the contract. Appellant has no quarrel with 
the holding of that case but respectfully submits it has 
no bearing in this one where the conveyance made by the< 
plaintiff-seller, which admittedly was absolute, was made 
only after the defendant-buyers had refused to perform 
their contract and the plaintiff-seller had commenced this 
action to enforce the contract. 
POINT II. 
A SELLER SHOULD NOT BE BARRED FROM RECOVER-
ING DAMAGES AS AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY TO 
SPE.CIFIC PERFORMANCE BY REASON OF SELLING THE 
SUBJECT PJ;tOPERTY AFTER BRINGING AN ACTION TO 
ENFORCE THE CONTRACT OF SALE. 
The crucial issue in this appeal is whether or not the 
following staten1ent from respondent's brief on page 8 
is a correct statement. of the law and whether it is appli-
cable to this appeal. "So, too, where the plaintiff, after 
the cmninencmnent of the action, has voluntarily done an 
act which makes specific performance i1npossible, 
through no fault of the defendant, the plaintiff is pre-
dwled frmn eontinning on hi8 action for specific perform-
ance." 
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Taken literally, such staten1ent IS not applicable be-
cause plaintiff is not seeking a decree of specific per-
fonnance in pursuing this action, as noted in Point I 
above. To the extent it conveys any meaning that no relief 
including damages as an alternative, may be granted 
in such a situation, it is applicable if the condition stated 
of "through no fault of defendant" is satisfied. Of course, 
the lower court did not attempt to determine fault in 
this proceeding and this court can not prejudge it. Thus, 
even if it finds support in the law (no authorities have 
been cited to that effect), the essential condition to its 
application has not been established. In addition it would 
appear novel to require, which such statement appears to 
imply, plaintiff to establish fault of defendant occurring 
after complaint is filed against him, as well as before, in 
order to pursue a remedy he had from the outset. 
Appellant asserts such is not the law. Respondents ac-
knowledge on page 8 of their brief that a plaintiff-seller 
may commence a new action at law for damages after 
selling the property so as to preclude the granting of 
specific performance in a prior equity suit. Respondent 
fails to offer any explanation as to why a new action may 
be commenced for the relief prayed for here but an exist-
ing suit can not be prosecuted under such circumstances. 
The trial court did not take the position now asserted 
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by respondent that "an examination of plaintiff's plead-
ings reveals that the plaintiff proceeded in this action on 
one theory and only one theory, that of specific perform-
ance." In fact the trial court originally considered it an 
action for damages only (R 23). 
Respondent would now support the dismissal with 
prejudice on the grounds that plaintiff elected to stand 
on a pleading for specific performance rather than 
amending the pleadings to convert it into an action for 
damages. This is curious inasmuch as the trial court ex-
tended to plaintiff an opportunity to pursue the first 
alternative prayer of specific perfoflnance by abandoning 
the alternative prayer for damages, which plaintiff re-
fused to do (R 22, 23). 
Plaintiff contends that no amendn1ent of the plead-
ings was essential. Technically the pleadings here could 
not have been a1nended but only supple1nented by reason 
of development~ since the cmnplaint was filed. Respond-
ents argue that the failure to include a prayer for special 
dmnages, which did not exist and were not ascertained 
until after the connnence1nent of the action, for the com-
Inission paid by plaintiff for the sale necessitated by de-
fendants' breach of their contnwt was fatal. Ho·we·n'r, the 
di~missal with prejudiel' ·was not based on the failure of 
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the pleadings to state a cause of action but on the pre-
trial court's view that under the facts of this case and 
the holding of the Supreme Court in the case of Andre,a-
son v. Hansen, which was not even decided, at least 
officially, at that time, that no cause of action existed 
which could be properly pleaded by plaintiff. If, however, 
respondent is correct in this positi~n, appellant respect-
fully submits that the lower court's dismissal should have 
been without prejudice, since it would not have been on 
the merits of the cause. Plaintiff could hardly have "stood 
on his pleadings" to avoid the rule in the Andreason case 
inasmuch as that case was not even decided at that time. 
Can the dismissal with prejudice be founded upon 
plaintiff's failure to pray for special damages 1 The spe-
cial damages, if it truly is such, is the real estate com-
mission paid by plaintiff in order to sell this property 
and pay part of that commission. As to the attorney's 
fees, it would certainly be imposing the need for imposs-
ible foresight to see that many months hence property 
purchased by a defaulting buyer could be resold for the 
contract price or more. If the right to attorney's fees is 
so conditional, the assurance ass-umed by contracting 
parties that the agreement can be enforced without cost 
to the injured party is certainly illusory. 
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Respondent's contention as to the prayer limiting the 
amount of recovery (except in default cases) is clearly 
contrary to the provision of Rule 54c(l) which states: 
"Except as to a party against whmn a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment·· shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief 
in his pleadings ... " Furthermore, our rules permit an 
amendment even after judgment to conform to the evi-
dence (R. 15 b). In addition, Rule 15(b) provides that 
even failure to so amend after judgment does not effect 
the result of a trial of issues. A1nendments during the 
course of a trial are proper and had respondent here ob-
jected to :the introduction of testimony proving such 
special damages as appellant's real estate commission for 
reselling the property, it is hardly likely that the trial 
court would even grant a continuance to permit the re-
spondent to meet such evidence as a condition of such 
amendment since he was already fully apprised of plain-
tiff's clain1 in this particular, except as to anwunt, by 
reason of plaintiff's answer to respondent's interrogatory 
#2 (R 11, R 13). 
Undoubtedly the issue as to respondent's liability 
!'or the real estate co1n1nission paid by plaintiff ·would 
have been 1nade a part of the pre-trial order and any 
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9 
necessary or desirB.ble amendments made to the pleading 
pursuant to Rule 16 had not the pre-trial judge immedi-
ately come to the conclusion that plaintiff had no cause 
of action as a result of the holding in Andreason vs. Han-
sen) supra, which he knew would be announced in that 
case by this Honorable· Court. 
Counsel for respondent can hardly be unaware that 
the court would be requested to award damages to plain-
tiff for the normal 5o/a real estate commission he had to 
pay on $17,950.00 sale less the $450.00 he received in 
addition to defendants' price and his attorney's feesand 
court costs in this matter. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF HAVING RETAINED THE EARNEST 
MONEY SHOULD NOT BE BARRED FROM RECOVERY IN 
AN ACTION AT LAW FOR DAMAGES EVEN IF THE DE-
CISION OF ANDREASON v. HANSEN IS SOUND ON ITS 
PARTICULAR FACTS. 
The instant case is readily and properly distinguish-
able from that case for the following reasons: 
1. In the Andreason case the property was resold 
before the action for damages was commenced. In this 
case an action to enforce the contract by specific per-
formance or in the alternative for damages was com-
menced before the property was sold. 
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2. The property here was not immediately resold 
for a· much lesser mnount, but rather held for Inany 
nwnths to obtain the highest possible price for it. Thus, 
damages were reduced rather than increased by the plain-
tiff's subsequent sale. 
3. Plaintiff here was not an attorney and held to 
the higher standard expected of members of that honor-
able profession, at least in legal matters. (This is not to 
imply that contractors are not also honorable.) 
4. Plaintiff was not guilty of laying any "deceptive 
nets," is not attempting any "over-reaching" in request-
ing his actual damages, and did not undertake to enforce 
this contract "with vengence." -'- -- -
The cause should he remanded to the District Court 
~~or trial on the merits. 
Very respectfully subnritted, 
ROBERT B. HANSE~ 
Attorney for Appelhwt 
and Plaintiff 
65 East ±th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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